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Summary  findings
Brazil's domestic debt has posed two challenges to  weak fiscal stance and quasi-fixed exchange rate regime)
policymakers: it has grown very fast and, despite  and the accumulation of assets (especially obligations of
progress, remains extremely short in maturity.  Brazil's states).
Bevilaqua and Garcia analyze Brazil's experience with  Simulations of the net debt path for the near future
domestic public debt management, searching for policy  underscore the importance of a tighter fiscal stance to
prescriptions for the next few years.  prevent the debt-to-GDP ratio from growing further.
After briefly reviewing the recent history of the  The authors'  main policy advice is to foster and rely
country's  domestic debt, they decompose the large rise in  more on inflation-linked bonds-the  least harmful way
federal bonded debt in 1995-98,  searching for its  to lengthen debt maturity.
macroeconomic causes. The main explanations:
extremely high interest payments (caused by Brazil's
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Rio de JaneiroExecutive  Summary
During the 1995 to  1998 period, the net public debt of the consolidated public  sector in
Brazil increased from 28.5 percent to 42.6 percent of GDP. This dramatic growth has raised
many doubts about the sustainability of the current economic policy in the country. These
concerns have been further increased by the exchange rate devaluation of January of 1999,
which raised  even more the  stock cf  the domestic public  debt--due to  the existence of
dollar-linked indexation clauses on part of the debt--, as well as the stock (in R$) of the
foreign debt.  The concerns about sustainability have been compounded by those related to
the very short maturity of the domestic public debt, which increased the vulnerability of the
country
In this  paper we assess the experierce  with public debt management  in Brazil in recent
years, attempting to evaluate its mair  lessons and derive policy guidelines for the next few
years, with emphasis on the issues pertaining to the structure of the debt (denomination,
indexation  and maturity).  We review  in Section II the genesis  of the modern  domestic
public debt market in Brazil. After being conceived in the second-half of the sixties as a
non-inflationary  instrument  of public finance,  and based,  initially,  entirely on inflation-
linked bonds, the public debt market expanded substantially in its early years, generating
for a while a seemingly costless way to fund public expenditures. During the 1980s, with
the rise in inflation,  cash management activities became predominant in the debt market.
Since  then, the  maturity  of the  public  debt has  been remarkably  short.  With inflation
stabilization, the debt has been gradually lengthened while nominal bonds became more
prevalent, even when total debt was growing fast due to fiscal deficits. The international
financial crises since 1997 changed that trend in the debt structure. As of October, 1999, the
share of nominal bonds is only  11.55%, while the average remaining life of the debt is still
very short.
Section III decomposes the large rise in  federal bonded debt during 1995-1998, searching
for  its  macroeconomic  causes.  It  attempts to  quantify  the  contraction  and  expansion
sources of the rapid increase in the stbck of federal bonded debt occurred during the period.
The main culprits are the weak fiscal stance, and the very high interest rates and associate
payments. In Section IV we perform simulation exercises of the public net debt path until
2002, the final year of the current presidential term.  We show that even under favorable
macroeconomic conditions the evolution of the public net debt to GDP ratio will remain a
policy concern in coming years.  Policy conclusions are summarized in Section V, where
we  discuss the role of public  debt management in  Brazil in the near future.  Our main
policy advice is that the rollover of the domestic public debt should be made with inflation-
indexed  bonds,  in  order  to  lengthen  the  maturity  without  creating  time  consistency
problems. We add a few suggestions on how this shift could be accomplished.I. Introduction'
From  1995 through  1998, the net puiblic debt of the consolidated public sector in Brazil
increased from 28.5 percent to 42.6 percent of GDP. This dramatic growth has raised many
doubts  about the  sustainability  of the  current  economic policy  in  the  country.  These
concerns have been further increased by the exchange rate devaluation of January of 1999,
which raised  even more the stock  of the domestic public debt,  due to  the existence of
dollar-linked indexation clauses on part of the debt, as well as the stock of the foreign debt
(in Reais).  The concerns about suslainability have been compounded by those related to
the very short maturity of the domestic public debt.
In this  paper we assess the experience with public debt management  in Brazil  in recent
years, attempting to evaluate its main lessons and derive policy guidelines for the next few
years, emphasizing the issues relatedl  to the structure of the debt. Section II discusses the
evolution of the domestic bonded public debt since 1970, with an emphasis on volume and
composition  (indexation and maturiLy) during the Real Plan.  Section III decomposes the
large  growth observed  in the  federal  bonded  debt  during  1995-1998, searching  for  its
macroeconomic causes.  It attempts to quantify the contraction and expansion sources of
the rapid increase in the stock of federal bonded debt that occurred during the period.  In
Section IV, we simulate paths of the net public debt until 2002, the final year of the current
presidential  term.  We  show  that  even under  favorable  macroeconomic  conditions  the
evolution of the public net debt to GDP ratio will remain a policy concern in coming years.
' We acknowledge  the World Bank's initiative  in commissioning  and financially  supporting  this study. All
views  in the paper are those of the authors.  We thank Suman  Bery,  Clemente  del Valle,  Xin Zhang,  and Eriko
Togo for comments and Aureo de Paula, Debora Masullo, Marcelo  Rezende,  Roberto Cohen and Tatiana
Didier for superb  research  assistance.  All errors  are ours.
3With the previous  sections as background, Section V concludes the paper with  a policy
analysis of public debt management in Brazil in the near future.  Our main policy advice is
that the rollover of the domestic public  debt should employ inflation-indexed bonds,  in
order to lengthen the maturity without creating time consistency problems.
II. Domestic Bonded Debt2
II.1. Historical  background  (19  70-1994)
The beginning of the existing market for domestic public debt in Brazil was the financial
reforms  introduced by  the military government  in the  second half  of the  1960s. Those
reforms envisaged three big measures to solve the inflationary problem of the previous ten
years  (inflation rose from  15% to  80% a year between  1955 and  1964): the creation of
marketable public securities to finance fiscal deficits; the creation of the Central Bank; and
the adoption of a banking system with a clear-cut separation between commercial banks
and non-bank institutions.
Figure  II.1-Federal  Bonds:  1970-1999-displays  the  evolution  of  the  total  federal
government  debt,  separating  the  Central  Bank  holdings  of  government  debt  from  the
outstanding debt held by the private sector. During the high inflation years--from the early
eighties to the mid-nineties--there had been a widening of the fraction of the public debt
held  by the  Central  Bank.  Under high  inflation,  cash  management  activities  tended  to
predominate in the banking sector and the Central Bank backing of such activities required
2 This Section  draws heavily on Bevilaqua,  Carneiro,  Garcia,  and Wemeck  (1999).
4the automatic  provision of liquidity  to banks'  holdings of public debt. This situation  stood
in marked contrast with the stated objectives  of the reforms.  Nevertheless,  the objective  of
institutional development  of a market for government  debt, which had been stated in the
financial  reforms  of 1964-5,  had been attained.
The domestic  public debt market in Blrazil  started with indexed bonds in the late sixties.
Only in August, 1970, nominal bond; unindexed were placed (for the stated purpose of
conducting monetary policy).
3 Indexed bonds (ORTNs - Obrigacoes Reajustaveis do
Tesouro  Nacional) were seen by asset holders as a hedge against inflation-induced  erosion
of financial wealth despite the fact that, until 1974, monetary correction was arbitrarily
defined each month by an act of the Mvinistry  of Finance,  without official commitment  to
any particular  price index.
Without  indexed  bonds, the financial  markets  would not have  developed  as they did in the
face of the accelerating  annual inflation  from 1973  to 1994. Figure 11.2-Federal Bonded
Debt Structure: 1970-1999-displays the remarkably mobile structure of the Brazilian
domestic  public debt.
During  the infancy  of the public domestic  debt  market (1966-1971),  the demand for public
debt grew ahead of the government's  immediate  financing  needs. A large stock of public
domestic debt was deemed convenient for regulating short-run liquidity of the banking
system, by means of final sales and purchases of public debt in the open market. As in
"Say's law", however,  the possibility  of creating  a large debt supply opened  room for the
creation, in  the  Central Bank, of a  wide range of  credit programs designed to  fund
3 Simonsen (1995).
5agricultural  projects  and  regional  development,  and  has  fostered  the  establishment  of
regional development banks at the state level. The excess demand for public bonds in the
early years of the market led the Central Bank to assume the role of a financing agent, 4 an
aberration that lasted for years. The development strategy of the 1970s was based in great
measure on the public sector's ability to issue debt to fund development projects.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, it became clear that this growth engine had stalled. The
decade witnessed  high and unstable inflation, which led to a considerable increase in the
volatility  of the expected returns on government debt due both to a decline in the use of
public savings and to frequent changes in monetary correction rules (i.e., partial disguised
defaults).  The  1980s were  called  the lost  decade,  due  to  the  economic  stagnation,  the
megainflation, and the decline in public, as well as private, investment. As a consequence,
the accumulation of public debt seemed to be approaching the end, and, by the turn of the
decade, a default on domestic public debt was seen by many as an unavoidable outcome.
In fact, the new government that took office in  1990 decreed the blocking of  80% of all
financial assets. The terms of the decree were actually complied with, and the government
was  able to  unblock  all the  financial assets  beginning  17 months  later,  in  12 monthly
installments.  During  1993-4, capital inflows  added to  the demand for high-yield  public
debt, creating a more stable environment that made the Real Plan possible.
4 For many years the Brazilian  Central  Bank  had a director  in charge  of Agricultural  Development  (sic).
611.2.  Recent Evolution: The Real Plan
In July 1994, a new currency, the Real, was introduced, as the last part of the de-indexation
program. Both the debt structure and size changed in important ways after the monetary
reform, as the annual inflation rate fell from a four-digit figure to a one-digit figure. Until
the Asian crisis (October, 1997), foreign capital kept flowing in steadily, and the domestic
public debt market experienced a period of gradual maturity lengthening due to decreasing
yield volatilities. Since the last quarter of 1997, a series of ups and downs has characterized
the  international  finance  scene  for the  emerging  markets, 5 also  affecting the  domestic
public  debt market.  After a semester when more than US$45 billion  of foreign reserves
vanished, the Brazilian government  decided to  float the Real  in January,  1999, thereby
inaugurating a new phase  of the P3lan.  We analyze below the debt accumulation process
since the introduction of the new currency, the Real, emphasizing debt size and structure
(indexation and maturity).
I.2.1. Size
The extremely fast increase of the federal bonded debt during the Real Plan was one of the
more ominous macroeconomic indicators. Figure II.3 displays the evolution of the federal
bonded  debt in constant R$ of April,  1999, and as percent of GDP. It is quite clear that,
after remaining stable during the first year of the new currency (July-94 to June-95), both
measures of debt accumulation started trending upward. As a  percent of GDP, the federal
bonded  debt. almost quadrupled in less than four years! Section III identifies the  factors
responsible for this enormous growrth.
7II. 2.2. Composition
This section analyzes the structure of the domestic debt, i.e., its composition: denomination
of the debt (domestic currency vs. foreign currency), indexation (to domestic price levels,
to  the exchange  rate, to  short-term interest rates, etc.), and  maturity structure.  We also
explore new measures of risk exposure, as the V@R (Value-at-Risk).
I1.2.2.1.  Denomination and  Inde-xation
All  domestic  federal  bonded  debt is redeemable  only  in  R$. Only  the external  debt is
redeemable in foreign currency. Figure II.4 displays the federal debt composition after the
Real Plan. It is clear that when the debt started trending upwards in mid-1995, it was the
nominal  (non-indexed) part that was mainly responsible for the growth. Notwithstanding
the increasing share of nominal in total debt, average maturity kept lengthening. Barcinski
[1997] computed a measure of risk usually applied to financial institutions portfolios the
V@R  (Value-at-Risk) for the nominal  federal debt. The V@R measures the amount  of
market risk of a given portfolio, i.e., the maximum expected loss of that portfolio in a given
time  span. 6 He  showed that,  notwithstanding  the  increase  in  the nominal  debt  and  its
maturity lengthening, the V@R of the nominal debt actually decreased for the first years of
the Real Plan (he analyzed 1994-1996). That reflected the fact that interest rate volatility
was  decreasing  substantially,  except  for the  first  semester  of  1995, when  it  increased
momentarily as a consequence of the Mexican crisis. This fall in interest rate volatility  is
displayed in Figure II.5.
5  Since  1997, all first semesters have been good ones, and all second semesters have been bad ones  for the
emerging markets. It is a general hope that the  spell will be broken this year.
6 For a detailed description of the V@R methodology, see Jorion [19971.
7 Adapted from Barcinski [1997].
8The  share  of  nominal  to  total  debt riemained around  30%-  40% between  July  94  and
November  95, when  it started to  grow, reaching  60%  around  mid-96. That  share  was
maintained  until the Asian crisis, in September,  1997, when it started to  drop. Until the
Russian crisis,  in  May,  1998, the  norninal debt share  was still above  50%, despite the
precipitous fall in average maturity. With the Russian crisis, the Treasury and the Central
Bank  started to issue only indexed debt (for reasons that will be analyzed later), and the
nominal  debt share  fell  to  3.5% in  December  1998.8 After  the nomination  of the  new
Central Bank governor, in March 1999, this share has been increasing again.
The  share  of  bonds  indexed  to  the  IGP-M  (a  widely  used  price  index)  decreased
continuously during the whole period. According to Central Bank sources, this reflected a
policy decision to  stop issuing inflation-linked bonds, which were deemed  inflationary. 9
Dollar-linked bonds remained at around 10% of the total debt between July 94 and August
95, falling then slightly to around 7% of the total between September 95 and February 96.
With the deterioration  of the economic situation in Asia,  these increased  once again to
reach 15% at the end of 1997. That share rose throughout 1998 to around 21% at year-end,
showing  that  agents  were  (correctly)  hedging  against  the  predicted  devaluation.  The
devaluation of January  13, 1999, and the continuous depreciation after the currency was
floated  two  days later,  increased the value  of the  dollar-linked  debt vis-a-vis the  other
8When  commenting  on the  changes  in composition, we will  often refer  to what  we think caused  those
changes (supply-driven or demand-driven changes). Of course, we are aware that we only observe equilibria
data, i.e., the intersection between  a supply and a demand curve. Therefore, statements such as the ones we
offer  would  actually need  careful studies of  -conometric  identification conditions  in order  to be  verified.
Nevertheless,  we will often take a  stab on what  caused the  composition changes: a  change  in demand,  a
change in supply, or both.
9  See previous  footnote. In the beginning of the Real  Plan the government was fighting several  forms  of
mandatory  indexation.  It  is quite  natural to  think  that  courts  would  be  more  likely to  uphold  previous
mandatory indexation clauses for wages or other sources of income if the government itself had kept inflation
indexation for some of its debt instruments. Apart from this indirect effect, we see no relation between  the
existence of inflation-linked bonds and inflatiori, (see the policy discussion.)
9bonds. The share jumped to 30% after the devaluation, but has fallen, since. as the demand
for  new  issues  of  dollar-linked  bond  has  diminished  considerably  and  the  currency
appreciated  after March,  1999. With the new round of depreciation  that started in  May,
1999, the demand for dollar-linked debt (or any hedge against the depreciation) has been
increasing again, forcing the Central Bank to supply more of this kind of debt'0 .
The share  of bonds indexed to the short-run interest rate (or zero-duration bonds)"  was
around 25% of the total debt between July 94 and July 95, 35% between August 95 and
February 96, falling to approximately 20% in November, 1997. In December, 1997, a large
issue of this kind of bonds distorted all debt-statistics. Around R$ 50 billion of bonds were
issued as part of a renegotiation deal with the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo,'2 making the
share of zero-duration bonds jump to 35%. After that, as those bonds were swapped with
the Central Bank for shorter-maturity ones, their share fell gradually to 21% in May, 1998,
when the beginning of the Russian crisis made the Central Bank and the Treasury change
strategies regarding the issuance of nominal bonds. As mentioned before, the issuance of
nominal  bonds  stopped,  and only  zero-duration bonds  started being  issued.  That move
made the share of the latter jump from 21% in May to 42% in June. By December,  1998,
10  A current important  policy issue is how much dollar-linked  debt (or other kinds of exchange-rate-risk
hedges, as future  contracts)  should  the government  provide  in the current  floating  exchange  rate regime.
l  The bond indexed  to the short-run interest  rate is a security sold at a discount which had its face-value
corrected  daily by the average daily interest  rates during  its term. It is a floating interest  rate, adapted  to the
high frequency  required  by the high inflation  and daily indexation  conditions  prevalent  when it was created
(1985). It would  be equivalent  to a bond whose  nominal  value is accrued  every day  by the daily accrual  of the
Libor. This is the closest  one can get to perfect  indexation  in fixed  income markets.  It corresponds  to a bond
of duration  zero (that being the reason  why we call this type of bond zero-duration  bond),  since it does not
suffers practically  no loss in its value when interest rates go up. These bonds were widely  used in times of
high uncertainty,  as, for example, the crossover  to the Cruzado  Plan in 1986.  On the other hand, monetary
policy has a very limited wealth effect, since rises in interest rates do not affect the value of the private
financial wealth in these fixed income securities (see Pastore, 1996).
12 These bonds were also of a much longer maturity  than the average  prevailing  at the time, fact which will
also distort  the average-maturity  statistic  for December,  1997,  as we will analyze  in the next Section.
10the zero-duration bond share was almnost  70%. It fell in January due to the increase in value
of  the  dollar-linked  bonds, and  it  kept falling  later  as  the  issuance  of  nominal  bonds
resumed after March, 1999. As of September, 1999, its share was hovering around 60%.
II.2.3. Maturity Structure
Figure  11.4 shows the  average  maturity of the debt  during the  Real  plan. The  average
maturity of the total debt has substantially increased in relative terms although it remains
quite low in absolute terms. 13 As already commented above, it is nonetheless interesting
that until the Asian crisis (September, 1997), maturity kept increasing despite the increasing
share (and total value) of the nominal debt. 
14 As noted before, until  1996, Barcinski [1997]
showed that,  the  V@R  (value-at-risk) of  the  nominal  debt  decreased  despite  the  size
increase and the maturity lengthening. In other words, investors in  public debt were  not
incurring more price risk, despite the increase in the portfolio size and in the nominal debt
maturity.
With the international financial crises, this  virtuous circle came to  an end. When Brazil
began to suffer the contagion effect of the Asian crisis, in the form of a speculative attack
during the week of October 27, 1997, the Central Bank quickly reacted by increasing the
basic interest rate, the TBC, from 20.70% to  43.41% (see Figure  11.6).  After two weeks
without public debt auctions, the rolling over continued with three-month-maturity bonds,
at rates little below the TBC.
13  When talking about debt maturity with foreign  economists,  we, Brazilian economists,  sometimes  cause
some confusion because of different measures.  We use "months" as the measure, while the former use
"years". The same used to happen with inflation  measures  before the Real Plan. We used "% per month",
while everyone else was used to "% per year". One hopes that soon we will able to follow the world
convention!
11In that environment, the Treasury and the Central Bank probably did not want to issue long
maturity debt. An interest rate of 43% per year (with the inflation rate well below 5% per
year and an exchange-rate devaluation of 7.5% per year) is clearly unsupportable in the
long run, being sustainable only briefly to counteract a speculative attack. Therefore, had
the Treasury and the Central Bank decided to place one or two year bonds at such a high
rate, they could conceivably have sparked a panic, because of the informational content of
such move. Placing debt at 43% for short periods might be desirable, but paying such high
rates for long periods puts the govermnent budget on a clearly unsustainable path. That
could then trigger expectations of a government default. In other words, in such a situation,
there may be no equilibrium with such a high interest rate and long maturity.15  The only
equilibrium may be the one with very short maturity bonds. An alternative explanation is
that the maturity premium asked by the market for longer maturity bonds was beyond the
maximum premium implied by the auction managers'  reservation prices.1 6 That rollover
strategy had the effect of decreasing the maturity of the stock of debt. Figure 11.6  shows that
interest rate volatilities increased tenfold during this turbulent period. As a consequence, so
did the V@R measures.
Until the  end of  1997, only three-month maturity bonds were placed,  all with  negative
maturity premia. During the first five months of 1998, the Treasury and the Central Bank
were able  to place  nominal debt with increasing maturity. However, when the  Russian
crisis first hit in May 1998, even short-term bonds (three or six months) became extremely
14  The  jump  in average  maturity  that  occurred  in September,  1997,  is a mistake.  The  Central  Bank  is trying  to
correct  that  statistic.  We  will  replace  the  Chart  when  the  correct  data  are  ready.
'5 The argument here follows the lines of the credit rationing model of Stiglitz and Weiss [ 1981].
16  We asked the Central  Bank staff member what had happened  in those auctions. He answered that the
Central Bank and the Treasury offered longer term bonds, but the bids were all refused, because they were
deemed insufficient in quantity, and the yields asked were both too high and too volatile.
12costly for the issuers, as yields rose substantially. As a consequence, the market for three-
month, six-month and one-year bonds vanished, and the only nominal bond placed in the
auctions after mid-May  were one-rnonth BBC's  (a nominal  bond issued  by the Central
Bank). In June and July, even that became too expensive, and the Central Bank resorted to
its last resource, the zero-duration bond.
This  decision  had  an immediate  impact on the  amounts that  were  rolled  over  in  each
auction. When the debt maturity decreases, the debt must be rolled over more often. That is
exactly what was happening until May 1998. The amounts of monthly redeemed and issued
debt tripled! This, of course, created a new source of risk, that of not being able to roll over
the debt in the event of a crisis, with possible impact on the exchange-rate anchor that was
in place at the time. After May, duce  to the strategy of placing only indexed bonds (mostly
zero-duration  and  dollar-linked),  average  maturity  resumed  its  upward  trend,  and  the
rollover risk decreased. However, this happened at a cost: if interest rates had to be lifted in
the  future,  the  fiscal  budget  would  be  badly  hit.  The  same  was  valid  regarding  a
devaluation.  With  the  benefit  of  hindsight,  we  know  now  that  both  strategies  caused
massive losses to the federal budget.
Even with zero-duration debt, average maturity fell again in the last quarter of 1998, due to
the  contagion  effect  of  the  Russian  default.  After  the  devaluation,  maturity  has  been
increasing  (see Figure  II.4). However, if the government were now to  decide to  quickly
change the current debt structure inl favor of nominal debt, either a fall in  maturity or a
substantial cost increase in debt service would be likely, as we will discuss in Section V.
13III. Evolution of the Gross Domestic Bonded Debt during the Real Plan: a
Decomposition Exercise
During the four years of President Fernando Henrique  Cardoso's first term, the federal
bonded debt increased to more than five times its original  value; from R$ 60 billion to R$
323 billion.' 7 This spectacular  debt growth  raises many  questions  about  the sustainability  of
economic  policy, especially  if one considers  the effects  of the exchange-rate  devaluation  in
January of 1999, which increased  even more the service  costs of federal bonded debt, due
to the existence  of dollar-linked  indexation  clauses  on part of the debt.
This Section  decomposes  the federal  bonded  debt growth,  searching  for the macroeconomic
causes of  the  huge growth that occurred in  1995-1998. We attempt to  quantify the
contraction  and expansion  sources  of the federal bonded  debt.
Consider the federal government  and Central Bank aggregate  balance sheets in  12/31/94
and 12/31/98,  respectively.  One of the accounts  on the liability side is the federal bonded
debt. The value we are interested  in explaining  is the difference  between this account's
balances on these two dates. Due to accounting identities, this value is the sum (with
opposite sign) of the differences during the period of all the other accounts' balances.
Consequently,  by aggregating  these other accounts' balances in a way amenable to our
macroeconomic  analysis, we measure the factors  responsible  for the growth of the federal
bonded debt in this four-year  period.  The idea of this decomposition  exercise  can be better
understood  with the accounting  framework  provided in Table III.1. The table starts from
''  These numbers  obtained  great  repercussion  in the press. The headline  of the 2/13/1999  edition  of the Sao
Paulo's  daily newspaper  0 Estado  de Sdo  Paulo was The public  debt increased  424%  in FHC term.
14the government budget constraint, and works to develop an accounting identity (equation
(6)) that is amenable to identifying the sources of the growth of federal bonded debt.
TABLE III.1.  DEBT USES: A DECCMPOSITION
(1) NET DEBT  =  LIABILITIES  - ASSETS
(2) A (NET DEBT)  =  A (LIABILITIES) - A (ASSETS)
(3) A (NET  DEBT)  PRIMARY  DEFICIT  +  INTEREST  PAYMENTS  +
ADJUSTMENTS
(4) A (LIABILITIES)  =  A (DOMESTIC BONDS)  +  A (OTHER DOMESTIC DEBT)  +
A (FOREIGN DEBT)
(5)  A (ASSETS)  =  A (DOMESTIC ASSETS)  +  A (FOREIGN ASSETS)
(3), (4), (5)  =*  (2), and solving for  A (DOMESTIC BONDS)
SOURCE OF FUNDS = USES OF FUNDS
(6) A DOMESTIC  BONDS  - PRIMARY DEFICIT  +  INTEREST PAYMENTS  +
ADJUSTMENTS  + A  (DOMESTIC  ASSETS)  +  A  (FOREIGN  ASSETS)
A (OTHER  DOMESTIC DEBT)  A (FOREIGN DEBT)
Thus, we search for an explanation for the R$262,369 million variation, as shown on Table
111.2,  of the federal bonded debt (federal government + Central Bank).
15TABLE 111.2. FEDERAL BONDED DEBT GROWTH: 1995-1998
December  December  Variation  Percent
1994  1998  Variation
Federal Bonded Debt  60,255  322,624  262,369  435.7%
(R$ Millions)
GDP (R$ Millions)  537,555  912,456  374,901  69.7%
Federal Bonded Debt (% GDP)  11.2  35.4  24.1  216.1%
Initially, we will aggregate the other accounts in the federal government and Central Bank
aggregate balance sheet in three groups, each one of them standing for one of the following
reasons to issue federal bonded debt'8, as laid out in Table 111.1.
1) To finance the federal government's (+ Central Bank's) deficit;
2) To accumulate foreign and domestic assets; and
3) To repay other previous debts (non-bonded debt).
Item #1 represents the difference in the two net worth figures (a fiscal deficit is a loss, and a
fiscal surplus is a profit); item #2, the asset accumulation during the period; and item #3,
the decrease in the aggregate of all other liability accounts. Thus, considering the federal
bonded debt as the "sources", and the other accounts as the "uses"  we can observe these
uses on Table III.3 and 111.4,  expressed in R$ and percentage of GDP, respectively.  19
18Here,  we are not determining  whether  the debt movements  resulted  from the fiscal,  monetary,  or exchange
rate policy.
'9 The total of the uses (in bold in Table III.2A) is equal to the source variation (in bold in Table 111.1),  both
equal to R$262,369.  Since this value results from  a sum of nominal values in R$ during four years with
significant and variable inflation, it should be used only as an accounting reference.
16TABLE 111.3. FEDERAL BONDED DEBT USES: 1995-1998
In R$ (Millions)  December  December  . Percentage
1994  1998  Variation
Net Debt (increase=deficit)  65,836  231,258  165,422  251.3%
Asset Accumulation  10)6,308  270,187  163,879  154.2%
Other Debts' Repayments (-)  111,889  178,822  66,933  59.8%
TOTAL  262,369
In percent of GDP, the data above are:
TABLE 111.4. FEDERAL BONDED DEBT USES IN percent OF GDP: 1995-1998
In percent GDP  December  December  Variation
1994  1998
Net Debt (increase=deficit)  12.25%  25.34%  13.10%
Asset Accumulation  19.78%  29.61%  9.83%
Other Debts' Repayments (-)  20.81%  19.60%  1.22%
24.15%
Table III.3 shows the federal bonded debt variation. The greatest share of the increases in
federal bonded debt was due to the federal deficit (which would be equal to the net debt
variation, if it were not for accounting details discussed above). The accumulation of assets
was responsible for a little bit less, 62.5% of the federal bonded debt growth. The increase
in other debts was responsible for the (negative) residual factor (-25.5%), which means that
if  the  other  debts  had  not  grown by  R$  66,933,  the federal  bonded  debt  would  have
increased  even  more.  Measured  as  a  share  percent  of  GDP,  the  federal  deficit  was
responsible for 54.2% of federal bonded debt growth of 24.15% of GDP (Table 111.4).  The
accumulation of assets was responsible for 40.7% of the federal bonded debt growth, while
17the other debts actually decreased as a percent of GDP, being responsible for the remaining
5.0% of the federal bonded debt growth. 20
We now turn to the decomposition of each of these three factors: the federal deficit, the
assets accumulation, and the repayment of other debts.
111.1  Financing  of thefederal  government  (+ Central Bank)  deficit
In order to make the net debt variation of the period (R$165,422 or  13.1% of the GDP)
compatible with the nominal  deficits registered during the same period, it is necessary to
make three  adjustments.  The first is to  add the  states',  municipalities'  and  state-owned
enterprises' net debt variation.
The second adjustment recognizes the privatization revenues. Since privatization revenues
occur only once, they are not included as current revenue in the public deficit computation.
Nevertheless,  they  are  financial inflows public  revenues  which,  ceteris paribus,  would
lower the net debt (the state-owned enterprises that were sold were not previously included
in the public sector assets). Under the hypothesis that everything else stayed constant, and
assuming that all the privatization revenues were used for public debt redemption, the gross
debt would diminish by  the exact amount of these privatization revenues. Therefore,  we
have to add these revenues to the variation of the total net debt in order to obtain the debt
variation concept that best conforms to the public deficit statistics.21
20  In Table  111.3,  all figures  are in R$,  while in Table  111.4,  the figures  are in percent  of GDP.  Therefore,  given
that nominal GDP grew during  the four-year  period,  the fact that "Other Debts" increased  in nominal terms,
while they decreased  as percent of GDP is an indication  that the increases  occurred  more to the end of the
period  relatively  to the decreases.
21  In reality, the relation between privatization  and public debt is much more complex  for  at least two
reasons. The first is that when a state-owned  enterprise  is sold, its debts are transferred  to the private sector,
diminishing  the net debt by a value  greater than the revenue  of the privatization.  The second reason is that
18The third  adjustment  is  related to  the  "Balance  Sheet  adjustment".22 The  idea  of  this
adjustment  is  that  the macroeconomic impacts  of the  "skeletons"  (old  debts  that  were
eventually repaid) occurred in the Fast. For example, the public debt issue for Banco do
Brasil's  recapitalization  - whose accumulated losses were  threatening  its  solvency  -
recognized losses derived from bad credit expansions in the past. Indeed, the debt issue was
not related to deficits during the recapitalization period, but to old deficits, that had never
been recognized until then. Thus, it i.s necessary to subtract the Balance Sheet adjustment's
variation from the total  net debt to obtain the debt variation concept  comparable to the
public deficit, namely, the "Net Fiscal Debt without Privatization".
Therefore, the following accounting identity should hold: for the fiscal statistics published
by the Brazilian Central Bank.
Increase in Net Fiscal Debt without Plrivatization  = Nominal Deficit.
Making the adjustments, we obtain:
some state-owned  enterprises  held public debt as part of their assets. This debt, apparently  was part of the
gross debt, but, since it belonged to a slate owned enterprise, was not part of the net debt. After the
privatization,  it also  became  part of the net debt.  Therefore  the study of the relation  between  privatization  and
the public  debt is still  a work in progress.
22  Footnote no I of Table XXI of Nota pcra  Imprensa (Monetary) of Banco Central do Brasil defines the
"Balance Sheet Adjustment"as the following:
"(basis: Dec/95) Computes the bond issues relative to the Banco do Brasil's recapitalization, the reduction of
the investment on the monetary reserve fuiid due to the court ruling involving the liquidation of the banks
Comind and Auxiliar, securitization of debts, the use of "privatization money" in the PND, renegotiation of
the Itaipu  and Eletronorte debts with the  SFN, the  inclusion of constitution funds, besides the  foreign debt
difference, due to balance conversions, end of period exchange rates and the flows by the monthly average
rate."
19TABLE 111.5.  MAKING  COMPATIBLE THE NET  FEDERAL DEBT  STATISTICS
AND THE NOMINAL DEBT STATISTICS IN R$:  1995-1998
In R$ (millions)  Dec/94  Dec/98  Variation  Percentage
Variation
Net Federal Debt (+ Central Bank)  65,836  231,258  165,422  251.3%
+ State's and Municipalities' Net Debt  51,091  130,905  79,814  156.2%
+ State Owned Enterprises' Net Debt  36,236  26,504  -9,732  -26.9%
=  Total Net Debt  153,163 388,667  235,504  153.8%
- Balance Sheet Adjustment  0  39,516  39,516
+ Privatization Adjustment  0  30,656  30,656
=Net  Fiscal  Debt  without  153,163 379,808  226,645  148.0%
Privatization
TABLE  I11.6.  MAKING  COMPATIBLE THE NET  FEDERAL DEBT  STATISTICS
AND THE NOMINAL DEBT STATISTICS IN percent OF GDP: 1995-1998
In percent of GDP  Dec/94  Dec/98  Variation
Net Federal Debt (+ Central Bank)  12.25%  25.34%  13.10%
+ State's and Municipalities' Net Debt  9.50%  14.35%  4.84%
+ State Owned Enterprises' Net Debt  6.74%  2.90%  -3.84%
=  Total Net Debt  28.49%  42.60%  14.10%
- Balance Sheet Adjustment  0.C0%  4.33%  4.33%
+ Privatization Adjustment  0.00%  3.36%  3.36%
=Net  Fiscal  Debt  without  28.49%  41.62%  13.13%
Privatization
Table III.7 shows the evolution  and the composition of the public deficit during  1995-8.
The net federal debt variation is slightly higher than the nominal deficits accumulated in the
same period (226,645 - 219,999 = R$6,646). This difference occurred during  1995, when
the Balance Sheet adjustments' methodology was not yet implemented. Therefore, an extra
20item  will be  included:  "Adjustment not  computed by  the  CB",  amounting to  R$6,646
millions
TABLE III.7.  PUBLIC SECTOR EORROWING REQUIREMENTS:1995-1998
In R$  1995  1996  1997  1998  Accumulated
Nominal  48,650  45,741  53,232  72,375  219,999
Federal Government and CB  15,632  19,946  22,912  49,351  107,841
States and Municipalities  24,141  21,076  26,377  18,416  90,010
State Owned Enterprises  8,877  4,720  3,943  4,608  22,148
Nominal Interest  51,065  45,001  44,923  72,492  21,3481
Federal Government and CB  19,554  22,854  20,537  54,485  117,430
States and Municipalities  22,992  16,840  19,941  16,570  76,343
State Owned Enterprises  8,519  5,309  4,444  1,437  19,709
Primary  -2,415  740  8,309  -116  6,518
Federal Government and CB  -3,922  -2,908  2,375  -5,134  -9,589
States and Municipalities  1,149  4,236  6,436  1,846  13,667
State Owned Enterprises  358  -589  -501  3,172  2,440
After all these adjustments, the equation which links the federal debt variation (+ Central
Bank) with the federal nominal deficit is expressed on Table 111.8.  It shows that the largest
share of item #1, which can be identified with the financing of the federal public debt (+
CB), was due to interest payments (71.0%). Item #1's second biggest expansion source was
21the Balance  Sheet adjustment. Note  that this  expansion effect  from  the  Balance Sheet
adjustment (23.9%) was substantially weakened by the privatization's contractionary effect
(-18.5%). As we have already discussed, none of these items constitutes exactly the public
deficit. According to the definition of the federal  deficit, neither  of the other items  -
related  to  states  and  municipalities (6.2%  of item  #1's  growth)  and  the  state  owned
enterprises (19.3%)  - should be included, since this item (#1) refers only to the federal
level. 23 The federal  govemment and  Central Bank's primary deficit had  a contractionist
impact during this period (-5.8%).
TABLE  111.8.  MAKING  THE  FEDERAL  NET  DEBT  STATISTICS  AND  THE
FEDERAL NOMINAL DEFICIT COMPATIBLE:  1995-1998
R$ (millions)  Percentage Share
= Federal Net Debt Variation (+ CB)  165,422
+ Nominal Interest (Federal Government + CB)  117,430  71.0%
+ Primary Deficit (Federal Government + CB)  -9,589  -5.8%
+ Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the  10,196  6.2%
States and Municipalities
+ Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the  31,894  19.3%
State Owned Enterprises
+ Patrimonial Adjustrnent Variation  39,516  23.9%
- Privatization Adjustment Variation  -30,656  -18.5%
+ Adjustment not Computed by the Central Bank  6,646  4.0%
= TOTAL  165,437  100.0%
1112 Accumulation  of assets
Table 111.9  decomposes the accumulation of assets during this period. Note that domestic
assets growth (194.42%) was substantially greater than the foreign assets' growth (64.04%).
23 Thus, it would  be expected  that the nominal  deficit  were equal  to the net debt variation,  for both the states
and municipalities  as for the state-owned  enterprises.  Therefore,  elucidating  these items  is still another  work
22The  growth  rates  are  unequal  among  the  domestic  assets  also.  The  states'  debts
renegotiation, which appears on items 1.3 and 1.4, is responsible for slightly more than half
of this increase (55.20%). The Central Bank's credits to financial institutions, which include
the Proer (the private banks' bailout program), also played a significant role: 17.04%
TABLE 111.9. ASSETS ACCUMULATION IN R$: 1995-1998
Percent Dec/94  Dec/98  Variation  Variation
1. Domestic  73,478.00  216,332.39  142,854.39  194.42%
1.1. FAT  10,125.00  27,878.83  17,753.83  175.35%
1.2. CB's credits to financial institulions 20,561.00  48,490.18  27,929.18  135.84%
1.3. Federal Government's credits  0.00  3,849.51  3,849.51
(Law 8727 / 93)
1.4. Debt Renegotiations with the sltates 0.00  86,612.46  86,612.46
1.5. Others  42,792.00  49,501.41  6,709.41  15.68%
2. Foreign Reserves  32,829.88  53,854.84  21,024.96  64.04%
TOTAL  106,307.88  270,187.23  163,879.35  154.16%
I1.3 Repayment of other kinds offeteralpublic  debt
As  shown  on  Table  111.3,  the other  debts  suffered,  in  nominal  terms,  a  net  increase.
Therefore, if the other debts had rernained the same, the federal public debt would have
increased even more in nominal terms. Table 111.10  shows the other kinds of debt variation
in this period. Once more, the domestic components growth is faster than the foreign one
in progress.
23(84.83% versus 41.96%). Among the domestic net debt components, the greatest share is
due to the Monetary Base, responsible for 32.18% of the total net debt variation.
TABLE III.10.  OTHER DEBTS VARIATION:1995-1998
R$ Millions
Dec/94  Dec/98  Variation  Variation
Percentage
1. Other Domestic Debt  46,618.00  86,164.38  39,546.38  84.83%
1.1. Monetary Base  17,685.00  39,223.00  21,538.00  121.79%
1.2. Others  28,933.00  46,941.38  18,008.38  62.24%
2. Foreign Debt  65,270.88  92,657.42  27,386.54  41.96%
TOTAL  111,888.88  178,821.80  66,932.92  59.82%
Table III.  11 summarizes the discussion about the factors of expansion and contraction  of
the  federal public  debt (in  nominal terms). One must  keep in  mind that,  since we  are
working with nominal  values over a period of four years, those values presented on this
table can be misleading.24 It is observed that the most important individual factor for debt
growth was interest payments (44.8%), followed by the accumulation of the state's debt
(33.0%).  If we  add these interest  payments to  the accumulation of  domestic assets,  the
quality of which is uncertain, we can "explain" more than 99% of the debt growth in this
24 We preferred to present first the nominal values so that the total value to be explained  was equal to that
published  by the Central  Bank.
24period. 25 Therefore,  it  is  quite reasonable  to  identify  the public  debt growth  with  the
deterioration of the fiscal position.
Table 111.12  summarizes the discussion about the factors of expansion and contraction of
the  federal  public  debt  (in  real  terms).  The  analysis  in  real  terms  generates  a  few
discrepancies from the previous analysis, and, of course, is the most relevant to the current
economic  situation  The  interest  rate  share  increased  even more  in real  terns:  interest
payments, percent at 13.76% of IJDP, alone exceeded the full variation of the federal net
debt (13.09%). A similar figure (13.95% of GDP) is obtained by adding the items [Nominal
Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the States and Municipalities], [Nominal Deficit minls
Net  Debt  Variation  of  the  State  Owned  Enterprises],  and  [Balance  Sheet  Adjustment
Variation]. Foreign Reserves actually fell as % of GDP (-0.21%), thereby making the whole
Asset Accumulation much less attractive as an indicator of solvency.
A word of caution is necessary. One should not infer from the previous analysis that the
bulk of the explosive growth in domestic bonded debt was due exclusively to the policy of
extremely high interest rates, and that had the interest rates been lower, the bonded  debt
would not have exploded. Interest rates were high not only because of the Central Bank's
policy decisions, but mainly because the fiscal stance became increasingly lax as the first
successes of the Real Plan appeared on the inflation front 26. Bevilaqua and Werneck (1998)
25  See Bevilaqua and Wemeck (1998)
26  One can decompose the high domestic interest rate along the lines of the covered interest parity condition,
to get: domestic interest rate = foreign interest rate + forward exchange-rate premium + covered interest parity
differential (country risk).
While the crawling-peg-exchange-rate rolicy  adopted in Brazil after April, 1995 created a wedge (the forward
exchange-rate  premium)  that  hovered  around  10 percentage  points,  the  country  risk  part had  also  been
substantial. The country risk component was mainly determined by the perception of an unsustainable  fiscal
policy. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that, had the government abandoned earlier the crawling-peg policy to
float the currency, interest rates would have fallen to international levels and the debt problem would have
never existed. To make this counterfactaal scenario plausible, a much stronger fiscal stance would have been
25show that the primary balance of the consolidated public sector deteriorated substantially
during 1994-8.
required.  And, if that were the case, interest  rates  would  have been  much lower  even under the crawling-peg
regime.
26TABLE III.11.  FEDERAL DEBT USES:1995-  1998  (R$ Millions)
Dec-94  Dec-98  Variation  Percentage Share
Federal Net Debt (+ CB)  65836  231258  165422  63.05%
Nominal Interests (Federal Government + CB)  117430  44.76%
Primary Deficit (Federal Government + CB)  -9589  -3.65%
Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the States and Municipalities  10196  3.89%
Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the State Owned Enterprises  31894  12.16%
Balance Sheet Adjustment Variation  39516  15.06%
Privatization Adjustment Variation (-)  -30656  -11.68%
Adjustment not Computed by the Central Bank  6646  2.53%
Assets  106308  270187  163879  62.46%
1. Domestic  73478  216332  142854  54.45%
1.1. FAT  10125  27879  17754  6.77%
1.2. CB's credits to the financial institutions  20561  48490  27929  10.65%
1.3. Federal Govermment's  credits (Law 8727 / 93)  0  3850  3850  1.47%
1.4. Debt Renegotiations with the states  0  86612  86612  33.01%
1.5. Others  42792  49501  6709  2.56%
2. Foreign Reserves  32830  53855  21025  8.01%
Other Debts (-)  111889  178822  -66933  -25.51%
1. Domestic  46618  86164  -39546  -15.07%
1.1. Monetary Base  17685  39223  -21538  -8.21%
1.2. Others  28933  46941  -18008  -6.86%
2. Foreign  65271  92657  -27387  -10.44%
TOTAL  262,368  100.00%
27TABLE 111.12. FEDERAL DEBT USES IN percent OF GDP: 1995- 1998
Dec-94  Dec-98  Variation
Federal Net Debt (+ CB)  12.25%  25.34%  13.09%
Nominal Interests (Federal Governrment  + CB)  13.76%
Primary Deficit (Federal Government + CB)  -1.19%
Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the States and Municipalities  4.17%
Nominal Deficit minus Net Debt Variation of the State Owned Enterprises  5.22%
Balance Sheet Adjustment Variation  4.56%
Privatization Adjustment Variation (-)  -3.44%
Adjustment not Computed by the Central Bank  0.87%
Total  23.95%
Assets  19.78%  29.61%  9.83%
1. Domestic  13.67%  23.71%  10.04%
1.1. FAT  1.88%  3.06%  1.17%
1.2. CB's credits to the financial institutions  3.82%  5.31%  1.49%
1.3. Federal Government's credits (Law 8727 / 93)  0.00%  0.42%  0.42%
1.4. Debt Renegotiations with the states  0.00%  9.49%  9.49%
1.5. Others  7.96%  5.43%  -2.54%
2. Foreign Reserves  6.11%  5.90%  -0.21%
Other Debts (-)  20.81%  19.60%  -1.22%
1. Domestic  8.67%  9.44%  0.77%
1.1. Monetary Base  3.29%  4.30%  1.01%
1.2. Others  5.38%  5.14%  -0.24%
2. Foreign  12.14%  10.15%  -1.99%
28IV.  Challenges Ahead: Deblt  Evolution in the Post-Devaluation Period
In this section we perform simulations of the public net debt path to 2002, the final year of
the current presidential term.  The starting point for the derivation of the model used for the
debt-dynamics  simulations  is the  standard budget  constraint  of the  consolidated public
sector,  which  in  the  case  of  Brazil  includes  the  central  government,  states  and
municipalities and public enterprises:
Mt-  +Mt  B1- B,E 1 Dt  +  i  Bt-1 +  Et  B  At  + Ht
PI  Pt  ~Pt  Pt  P  P  B1  Pt  Pt
where M is the monetary  base, B is the net domestic debt, B* is the foreign debt net of
international reserves, E is the nominal exchange rate in reais per dollar, D is the primary
balance, it is the domestic  interest rate, r is the foreign interest rate, A are privatization
revenues and H represents hidden and contingent liabilities.
It is useful to rewrite equation (1) ir terms of flows and stocks per unit of domestic product:
Mt  Mt-1  Bt  +Bt-1  Et (Bt  -Bt- 1 )
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  +  +tB  t  ___  _  _  _  _
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Dt  +  t  + i  t  B  - At  +  _Ht  (2)
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where c,  d, a and h are, respectively, seignorage, primary balance, privatization revenues
and hidden and contingent liabilities in terms of GDP.
Equation (3) can be further rearranged as:
Bt- 1 _____it)  Et.1 E t  (1 +i,) 
b  +b*  - +  y  bt  - +h(  (4)
t  t  P1  t-I  1_t-I  t Yt  t-l  t-I  Et-l  Pt  yt  - t-a
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bt  + b*  =  bt  l  +  (  it)  + bt  (I + i*)(1 +g)_  +  EJ  +t(5
t  t  t-I  (  +  TCt)(1 +  nt)  (1  +  71t)(1  +  nt)  ''+d  a  5
where b and b* are, respectively, net domestic debt and net foreign debt in terms of GDP, 7i
is the inflation rate, n is the rate of growth of real GDP and s is the rate of devaluation of
the nominal exchange rate.
Equation (5) may be used to simulate the path of the net domestic debt in Brazil over the
medium term taking into account specific assumptions about the primary balance, inflation
rate, rate of growth of real GDP, nominal exchange rate devaluation, domestic and foreign
interest  rates,  and  seignorage  revenues.  In  addition,  since the  government  intends  to
30continue its privatization program, one needs to make assumptions about how that program
will  be  implemented.  Finally,  it is  necessary  to  take  into  account  the  fact  that  the
government  has  hidden  and  contingent  liabilities which  will  be  recognized  in  coming
years. 27
The main assumptions for the baseline scenario (Scenario 1) are shown in Table IV.1.  The
primary balance path corresponds to the full implementation of the IMF supported program
over the period 1999-2001.  According to the agreed targets, the consolidated public sector
will generate primary surpluses of at least 3.1 percent of GDP in  1999, 3.3 percent of GDP
in  2000,  and  3.4 percent  of  GI)P  in  2001.  For  2002,  the  final  year  of  the  current
presidential term and end of the simulation period, it is assumed that the improved fiscal
stance is sustained, with the primary surplus remaining at 3.4 percent of GDP.
TABLE IV.1.  SCENARIO 1 - BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Variables  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Primary balance  0.0%  3.1%  3.3%  3.4%  3.4%
Real GDP growth  0.2%  0.0%  3.0%  3.5%  4.0%
Domestic inflation rate  1.4%  10.0%  6.0%  6.0%  4.0%
Nominal depreciation (R$/US$)  8.2%  65.0%  -5.0%  5.0%  4.0%
Nominal Domestic interest rate  29.5%  26.0%  16.0%  13.0%  11.0%
Foreign interest rate  8.5%  8.8%  9.0%  8.8%  8.5%
Seignorage  0.8%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%
Privatization  1.4%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%
Hidden liabilities  2.3%  2.5%  2.5%  2.5%  2.5%
27 The social security  burden,  which is thie  biggest  contingent  liability  for the public sector,  is incorporated  in
the primary  balance.
31Total revenues from privatization are projected at about 1.0 percent of GDP in  1999, and
1.0 percent of GDP thereafter.  The bulk of the resources should come from the completion
of the privatization of federal electricity generation companies in 1999, the privatization of
the  electricity transmission network from  2000, sales of remaining  shares of  previously
privatized companies,  such as CVRD and Light, and sales of the noncontrolling share of
Petrobras.  The amount for  1999 was assumed to be less than the original figure of 2.8
percent of GDP contemplated in the IMF supported program, and less than the 1.3 percent
assumed in the July 1999 revision of the program, because of the privatization results as of
October  1999.  In  addition, it is assumed that the government  will recognize about  2.5
percent of GDP in hidden and contingent liabilities every year during 1999-2002.28
The tightening in the fiscal stance will help to reduce the burden on monetary policy and
will allow for a decline in the domestic real interest rate from about 15 percent in 1999 to 9
percent in 2000, and 7 percent in 2001 and thereafter. The reduction in the domestic real
interest rate in response to the improved fiscal stance should be a natural consequence of
the improvement in the risk assessment of the country as the fiscal adjustment is sustained
over  the years.  The drop  in the  real interest  rate will  induce a  recovery  in  economic
activity, with the rate of growth of real GDP increasing to 3 percent in 2000, 3.5 percent in
2001, and settling at about 4 percent.  Finally, the change in the policy mix brings about a
steady decline in the inflation rate from  10 percent in 1999 to 4 percent in 2002.  It also
28 This amount  of hidden  and contingent  liabilities  is higher  than what is assumed  in the IMF  program.
32results in  a substantial  devaluaticn in the real exchange rate in  1999, which  is partially
reversed in 2000 by a nominal exchange rate appreciation. 29
Results for the simulation of the consolidated public sector debt path during 1999-2002 are
presented in Table IV.2.  The model simulates the values of total net debt in the last line of
the table  and then distributes it according to the relative shares of net domestic and net
foreign debt observed in the preceding year.  Under the assumptions of Scenario 1, the ratio
of net public debt to GDP rises tc 50.1 percent in 1999 and then declines slightly to about
49.1  percent  in  2002.  This  scenario  highlights the  key  role  played  by  the  sustained
improvement in the fiscal stance in  stabilizing the net debt to  GDP ratio in the medium
term,  even  as  the  federal  govermnent  recognizes  a  substantial  amount  of  hidden  and
contingent liabilities every year.
TABLE IV.2.  SCENARIO 1 -NET DEBT PATH, 1998/2002
Variables  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Net Domestic Debt  36.0%  39.3%  39.3%  38.9%  38.5%
Net Foreign Debt  6.6%  10.8%  10.8%  10.7%  10.6%
Total Net Debt  42.6%  50.1%  50.0%  49.6%  49.1%
In  order  to  stress  further the  inLportance of the programmed  primary  surpluses for the
stabilization of the  net debt to  3iDP ratio over the  medium term,  a  second  scenario  is
considered in which there is a milder adjustment in the fiscal position of the consolidated
public  sector, perhaps because cf  delays in the implementation of fiscal reforms.  Table
29  The inflation rate  in the  debt simulation exercises should be a proxy  for the GDP  deflator.  Here  it is
measured by the average IGP-DI.
33IV.3 presents  the  basic  assumptions  of  this  alternative  scenario  (Scenario  2).  After
increasing to 3.1 percent of GDP in 1999, the primary balance is assumed to decrease to 2
percent  of  GDP  in  2000  and remain  at this  level  thereafter.  To put  this  number  in
perspective, a 2 percent of  GDP surplus represents a much tighter  fiscal stance for the
consolidated public  sector than  what was  observed during  any  year in  the  1995-1998
period.
TABLE IV.3.  SCENARIO 2 -BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Variables  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Primary balance  0.0%  3.1%  2.0%  2.0%  2.0%
Real GDP growth  0.2%  0.0%  2.5%  3.0%  3.5%
Domestic inflation rate  1.4%  10.0%  8.0%  6.0%  4.0%
Nominal depreciation (R$/US$)  8.2%  65.0%  6.0%  5.0%  4.0%
Nominal domestic interest rate  29.5%  26.0%  18.0%  16.0%  13.0%
Foreign interest rate  8.5%  8.8%  9.0%  8.8%  8.5%
Seignorage  0.8%  0.3%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%
Privatization  1.4%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%  1.0%
Hidden liabilities  2.3%  2.5%  2.5%  2.5%  2.5%
With the weaker adjustment in the fiscal position, monetary policy is supposed to carry a
larger share of the burden for keeping inflation low.  It is assumed that the real interest rate
will drop to  11 percent in 2000 and will remain at 9 percent after 2001.  Real GDP growth
will rise to  2.5 in 2000, 3 percent in 2001 and 3.5 percent in 2002.  In this alternative
scenario the inflation rate is reduced to 8 rather than 6 percent in 2000 and the currency has
a  further  nominal  depreciation  in  the  same  year.  The  assumptions  about  the  other
34macroeconomic  variables  remain  the same  in  order  to  facilitate  the  comparison  with
Scenario 1.  30
As  Table  IV.4  indicates,  this  scenrrio  for  the  primary  balance  implies  a  significantly
different path for the net-debt to GD P ratio.  The total net debt ratio increases steadily from
50.1 percent of GDP in 1999 to 57.3 percent of GDP in 2002.
TABLE IV.4.  SCENARIO 2 -NET DEBT PATH, 1998/2002
Variables  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002
Net Domestic Debt  36.0%  39.3%  41.2%  43.0%  44.9%
Net Foreign Debt  6.6%  10.8%  11.3%  11.8%  12.3%
Total Net Debt  42.6%  50.1%  52.5%  54.9%  57.3%
V. Policy discussion
As  the simulation results  from the previous  section indicate, even under  very favorable
macroeconomic conditions the evoluition  of the net debt to GDP ratio will remain a policy
concern in coming years.  Under these circumstances, what role should be played by public
debt management in the near future?
We see public debt management as constrained by a fundamental policy consideration in
the short-run.  Although perceptions about the likelihood of a debt rollover crisis in Brazil
30 Though  some of them, such as the paths for the inflation  and nominal  interest  rates after 2000, are at odds
with the weaker fiscal stance  and the nominal  devaluation.  We do that to stress the importance  of a tougher
fiscal  instance.
35have improved considerably since the January 1999 devaluation, the large stock of short-
term  debt  remains  an  important  source  of  anxiety,  especially  on  the  part  of  foreign
investors.  Even if there are reasons to believe that such a concern is somewhat misplaced3 1,
a practical implication of this fact is that the risk premium on Brazilian securities remains
higher than what it would likely be if the same public sector borrowing requirements were
financed with longer maturity debt.  A central priority of debt management in the short and
medium-run, therefore, should be to intensify efforts to lengthen the average maturity of the
public  debt.  Furthermore,  given the need to reduce the interest burden  of the debt  and
increase the  sustainability of the current fiscal  stance, such maturity  lengthening should
naturally be implemented at the lowest possible cost.
What  kind  of debt instruments  will be  more appropriate under  these conditions?  It  is
expected that under the current IMF supported program the share of external and foreign
exchange-indexed debt in the total public debt will be reduced gradually.  Therefore, the
process of debt maturity lengthening must be conducted through the issuance of domestic
debt, either nominal or indexed.
What should be the relative shares of these instruments in debt placements?  For the sake of
clarity of the exposition, we partition the question of how much of each kind of debt should
be issued in two layers.  First, one should determine how much nominal against indexed
debt should be issued.  Second, among the several kinds of indexed debt, how much of each
kind  should be issued (zero-duration and inflation-linked). Although the determination of
3'  See Bevilaqua and Garcia (1999).
36the  debt  structure  is  a  multiple-choice  allocation  problem,  the  two-layered  scheme  is
adequate for the Brazilian case, as wo now explain.
To  lengthen the average maturity of the debt requires the issuance of indexed debt, since
long nominal debt  (above two or thiee years) can only be issued at an abnormally high-risk
premium.  Therefore, the basic policy recommendation concerning the public debt structure
for the Brazilian  economy  in coming months is to  issue nominal  debt with the highest
possible maturity without creating an extremely upward sloping yield curve at the end.  For
the  time  nodes previously  "conquered",  issue the highest possible  amounts that  do not
create "price-pressure" effects. For the bulk of the rollover and for the new additions to the
debt stock, indexed debt should be  issued, to lengthen the maturity structure as much as
possible.
In terms of placement procedures, the authorities should announce the auctions as far  in
advance  as possible 32 and avoid p]acing unexpected amounts of  short-term securities  in
order to profit from the low maturity premia of the shorter maturities. Placing short-term
debt because it is cheaper in an env-ronment of lack of confidence jeopardizes the situation
of the previous long-debt holders, because the short-debt holders have a liquidation option
over those,  and  harms  the debt market  in the long run.  It is akin to the  issue of debt
seniority: the short-term debt holders hold debt that is senior vis-ai-vis the long-term debt
holders, since the former will matuwe  before the latter. Information regarding the process of
32 This measure was included in the debt management strategy package recently announced by the Brazilian
authorities.  According  to the  newspaper The Economist (11/11/1999),  ... among  the  main features  of  the
central bank's planned  reforms are: to haldfewer,  bigger auctions of debt, with dates announcedfurther  in
advance; to reduce drastically the types of bonds on the market (there are currently more than 200, many of
them small,  illiquid issues relating to former  state firms);  to allow banks to have  "short" positions  on the
bond market (ie, to sell bonds they do not own),  plus other rule-changes to promote  liquidity and to be more
open in publishing details of the debt.
37debt  lengthening  must  be  well conveyed  to  the  market,  so that  debt holders  know  in
advance that they will be purchasing liquid instruments, and that the government will not
"cheat" on them by placing shorter instruments in the future.
An important question remains on how much of each kind of indexed debt (zero-duration,
inflation-linked,  exchange-rate-linked,  or  another  form  as  discussed  below)  should  be
issued.  The exchange-rate-linked debt share, as already mentioned, must conform to the
guidelines  of the current IMF  supported program.  Given the current inflation targeting
framework  the  use  of  zero-duration  debt  poses  a  version  of  the  well-known  time
consistency problem.  The over reliance on zero-duration debt, as in the current situation
with  almost 60% of total  debt in this form, may reduce monetary  policy credibility  and
commitment, because policy makers may become more exposed to choices and trade-offs
between tight money policies to contain inflation and the budgetary impact of higher short-
term rates.  Therefore, it is advisable to reduce the share of this kind of indexed debt in the
total public sector debt.
Therefore, the remaining instrument to be used in the process of maturity lengthening  is
inflation-linked debt.  The main objection to this kind of debt indexation is that it may have
inflationary effects.  Nevertheless, as Price (1997) emphasizes (...) the academic literature
suggests no necessary connection between indexed bonds (or indexation in general) and
inflation.  The emergence of inflation depends on other circumstances and policies  that are
independent of  indexation.  Recent government  issuers of  indexed bonds in fact  point  to
credibility  enhancements that may result from  issuing indexed bonds, by neutralizing  the
38inflation tax. 33 Price's  advice is that (..)  in newly developing or transition markets, they
[indexed bonds]  could  be  envisaged  as part  of  a  concomitant package  of fiscal  and
monetary reforms to foster  longer-term capitalformation,  along with strong commitments
to price stability. 34
The current  share of  inflation-linked debt is negligible.  This  was a  result of  a policy
decision after the Real Plan, when debt managers-convinced  that inflation-linked debt was
inflationary  by  conveying  to  the market  a  lack of  anti-inflationary  commitment  of the
government-decided  to phase it DUt. Our policy advice is to reverse that decision.  It is
reasonable to  assume  that there is  a natural demand  for such long-term-inflation-linked
bonds  from  pension  funds,  insurance  companies,  and  other  market  participants  whose
liabilities are both  long-term and  display high  correlation to the price  level.  For these
market  participants,  long-term-inilation-linked  bonds  constitute a  hedge, and,  therefore,
may be sold at a lower yield (higher price). 35
3  Page 53.
Page 55.
3  In order to  encourage discussion about the best transition strategy toward a higher share of  long-term-
inflation-linked bonds, we list here a few ideas of financial engineering that were collected among market
participants and add a few ideas of our own.  One possible instrument is a bond that would pay the higher of
two indices: the inflation index plus a real rate (defined ex-ante), or a percentage of the accrual of the daily
interest rates (Selic) during the bond's lif . In the auction, market participants would bid for the percentage of
the accrual of the daily interest rates (the lower the percentage, the more likely to win).  This "mongrel"  bond
could provide a natural transition betwe  en the  current zero-duration bonds and the  inflation-linked bonds.
While the holders of the "mongrel" bonds would guarantee the natural hedge provided by inflation protection
(plus the real rate), they would also retrieve an option to profit from the high interest rates.  The gain for the
govemment  would be  the  decrease of the  harm in the  fiscal accounts posed by  an increase  in short-term
interest rates, thereby alleviating the time consistency problem discussed before.  Another similar "mongrel"
bond could be constructed by adding options to a  standard inflation-linked-bond (plus an ex-ante real rate)
with maturity of several years. These options, to be  exercised at the beginning of each  year of the bond's
maturity, would change the yield from iniflation  plus the real rate to a percentage of the accrual of the daily
interest rates during the following year.  I.e., every year the debt holder would decide ex ante which  index
would be used to compute the bond's  return.  As before, the percentage  of the accrual of the  daily interest
rates would be defined in the auction.  Tlie expectation is that with the success of the plan, market participants
would not exercise the options, thereby in fact migrating to inflation-linked bonds, and alleviating the fiscal,
and the derived  monetary policy, time consistency problems.  Again, the possible benefit of these "mongrel"
bonds would be to allow  the maturity lengthening of the  debt with the minimum possible fiscal cost and
without generating time consistency prot lems for the inflation targeting framework.
39Of course, as the Real Plan achieves its long-term goals of promoting growth in a
low-inflation environment, the debt structure should naturally shift towards nominal debt,
including long-term securities.  However, since it would be infeasible to try to engineer this
shift at present, we see the indexation to inflation as the least harmful way to lengthen the
debt maturity.
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41APPENDIX  1
-Certificates whose
CFT  functions to support
operationis with specifics
necessities defined in the
law, possibly being issued
in distinct series. These
Bonids  are divided in:
Term: up to 30 years.  - Nominative and  On the redemption  On the date
CFT-A  Interest Rates: up to 6%  negotiable.  Monthly by the IGP-D1  date
P Y.  - Direct to the interested
oile.
CFT-B  Term: up to 30 years.  - Nominative and  On the redemption  On the date
lnterest  Rate: up to 6%  negotiable.  TR  date
PY.  - Direct to the interested
one
CFT-D  Term: up to 30 years.  - Nominative and  On the redemption  On the date
Interest Rate: up to 6%  negotiable.  Commercial dollar,  date
P Y.  - Direct to the interested  considering the average
one  selling rates of the week
days immediately before
the issuance and
redemption dates of the
bond.
- Replacement of  bonds  Up to 30 years,  - Book entry, nominate  Commercial dollar,  Semiannually,  Respecting the  71/72
NTN-A  issued in the foreign debt  respecting the original  and negotiable  considering the average  observing the interest  chronogram of
restructuring process.  chronogram of the dates  selling rates of the week  payment dates of the  the bond which
Interest Rates: Variable  - Direct to the interested  days immediately before  foreign debt bond  generated the
up to 12%  p.y.,  one  the issuance and  which generated the  replacement
depending on the bond.  redemption dates of the  replacement  operation.
bond.  operation, with
adjustment in the first
period of fluency.
NTN-B  At least 12 months  - Book entry, nominate  IGP-M  On the redemption  On the due date  76
- Placed in The Central  Interest Rate: 6% p.y.  and negotiable  date
Bank's  portfolio,  - Direct to the interested
substituting shorter term  Die
bonds, specially LFT.  one
-Capitalization of totally or
partially state owned
enterprises.
-Bond issued by the  IGP-M  Semiannually, with  On due date  77
Tesouro Nacional to cover  adjustment in the first
NTN-C  budget deficits, as well as  period of fluency
operations for receipts  At least 12 months.  -Book entry, nominative  when necessary.
antecipation.  Interest rates: 6% p.y.
and negotiable
- Public Offering
NTN-D  -Bond issued by the  Commercial dollar,  Semiannually, with  On due date  78
Tesouro Nacional to cover  considering the average  adjustment in the first
budget deficits, as well as  selling rates of the week  period of fluency
operations for receipts  At least 3 months.  -Book entry, nominative  days immediately before  when necessary
antecipation . Interest rates: 6% p.y.  the issuance and




Source:  Banco Central  do Brasil, Tesouro Nacional and Andima.
42-Bond issued by the  Book entry, nominate  _  Semnannually  On the due date  90
Tesouro Nacional to cover  and negotiable
NNE  budget  deficits,  as  well  as
operations for receipts  Up to 30 years.
antecipation  Interest Rates: TBF, with
monthly renegotiation
of interest.
-Warranity  to the the Banco  Up to 30 years,  - Book entry, nominate  TR  On the redemption  On the due date  75
NTN-F  do Brasil in operations  Interest Rates: up to 5%  and negotiable  date
contracted by tnanps with  P.Y.
the FAT.  - Direct to the interested
one
NTN-H  -Bond issued by the  At least 3 months  - Book entry, nominate  TR  . On the due date  79
Tesouro Nacional to cover  and negotiable
budget deficits, as well as
operations for receipts  - Public Offering
antecipation
. ce  Upt_hede
- To obtain resources for  Up to 25 years.  Commercial dollar,  Up to the due  88
the payment of interest  . . considering  the average  date of the
NTN-I  rates equalization of the  -Book entiy, ibomative  selling rates of the week  respective parcel
financing of exports of  and negotiable  days immediately before  of interest of the
Brazilian goods aiid  - . the issuance and  exports
services suported by the  - Direct to the  nterested  redemption dates of the  financing.  89
Proex.  bond
NTN-J  -Capitalization of Banco  Only after 3 years.  On the due date
de Brasil.  Up to 15  years.  -Book entny,  nominative  Interests until the end
Initerest  rates:  average  and  neoibeof  these  3 years  are
return of LTN or average  mcorporated to
Selic.  - Direct to the interested  principal.
one
NTN-L  - Are issued to be  Commercial dollar,  On the redemption  On the due date,  80
exchanged for Tesouro  -Book  ny  nominative  considering the average  date  possibly
Nacional bonds which  -Book  entry,  selling rates of the week  redeemed before
belong to the Banco  Up to 2 years.  an  negotiabe  days immediately before  as a consequence
Central portfolio, they mnst  the issuance and  of the
be undertakeni  by the  redemption dates of the  assumption, by
Tesouro Nacional,  Interest Rates: 5% p.y.  bond  the Tesouro
according  to the  Piano  Nacional, of the
Brasileiro de  foreign debt,
Refinanciamento and  which is a
Clube de Paris.  currently a
Central Bank's
responsabilty.
NTN-M  - Obtained with resources  Commercial dollar.  Semiannually, with  17 semiannual  85/86
of capitalizations for the  -15 years.  -Book entry, nominative  adjustment in the first  and consecutive
support of the Plano  d  hobl  penod of fluency  parcels,
Brasileiro de Dinheiro  an  negotabe  when necessary.  beginning in
Novo e de Conversao de  Interest Rates: Libor  4/15/2001.
Divida, in 11/29/93.  semiannual plus a spread
of 0,875% p.y., up to  - Direct to the interested
1
2% p.y.  one
NTN-P  - To be exchanged for the  At least  15 years.  TR  On the  redemption  On the due date  74/81
product in money of  Interest Rates: 6% p.y.  -Book entry, nominative  date
transfers of goods and  and negotiable
claims in the ambit of the  a  negotiabe
PND.  - Direct to  the interested
one
43-To  b  purch ased  My  soctiaK
i  NTN-R  sectirity  private  institutiolis
which  have,  as  sponsors,
exclusive  or  isot, stated owned
eniterprises,  mixed  economy
societies,  froin  the  federal  or
state  government,  inicluding  the
ones  ot  special  nature  and
foundations  created  by  the
govennmenit.  It is facultative the
purchase  of  NTN-R  by  other
private  owied  social  security
iiistitiltions,  instirance  and
capitalizationi  companies.  The
bhld  is divided ijD
2 years  - Nominative and  -Commercial  dollar, considering  On the due date.  83
Interest Rates: 8 %  Negotiable,  the average selling rates.  On the
NTN-RI  P y  -Direct the interested  -Commercial  dollar, considering  redemption
one  the average selling  rates.  date.
10 years  - Nominative and
Interest Rates: 12%  tiegotiable.  Monthly.  In 10 annual, equal and  84
P Y  - Direct  to the interest  successive  parcels.
one
- Bond issted by the tIesotiro  First period of at least  - Nominative and  Average adjusted rate of  On the due rate.  87/97
NTN-i  S  Nacional to cover budged  7 days, prefixed.  Negotiable.  financing, according to the
,T  ,-S  deficits, as credit operations for  Selic, for federal bonds,
receipts antecipation.  Second period of at  -Public Offering  accumulated  from the beginning
least 21 days,  of the second period.
postfixed.
- Warratity  to Banco do Brasil in  Up to 15 years.  - Nominative and  Based on an index generated  On the  On the due date  82
NTN-T  operations with the Minist6rio  Interest Rates: 5 %  Negotiable.  from the T]PL, publicized  by  redemption
da Saride  with the FAT.  PY.  Bacen from the issuance date on  date
- Direct tI the interest  the due date.
one
-Warranity  to Banco do Brasil in  Up to 15 yers.  - nominative and  Based on an index generated  Monthly  Monthly, each parcel  91
NI N- t '  operations  contracted  by the  Interest  rates:  6,53%  negotiable.  from the TJPL,  publicized  by  corresponds  to the result
NTN-,'  Minist6rio do Plasejamento e  p.y. calculated over  Bacen  form the issuance date to  obtained dividing the
orgainento with the FAT  the uipdate  nominal  - direct to the  the due date.  reAmaining  balance,
value.  interested one  updated and captalized,




-To provide the necessary  Maturity: deterrnined  - Book entry,  Average  adjusted rate of the  On the due date.  21
[FT  resotirces to cover the budget  by the STN  nominative and  financing, according to the selic,
deficit, as well as credit  negotiable  for federal bonds.
operatioti for buidget  receipts  -Direct tD  the
aiitecipatiosi.  interested one or
public offering.
A  - Bonds  which  are used  by  the  15 years  -Book  entry,
Federal Govemment to  interest rates: average  nominative and  On the due  In 180 monthly and
uindertake  debts whiichl  are  Setic plus 0.0245%  imegotiable.  date of each of  consecutive parcels,  23
responisibility  of the states and  p.m.  -Direct to the  the 180  selling the first in the
the Federal  District.  interested one  monthly  first month after the
parcels.  issuance Each parcel
corresponds to the result
obtained through  the
division of the remaining
debt verified on the due
date of each parcel by
B  15 years  the number of remaining
-Boads which are used by the  Iiiterest Rate: average  -Book entry,  On the  parcels, including the
federal govenimemit  to utidertake  Selic  tiominative and  redemption  one which as due.
debts whicih  are responsibility of  negotiable.  date
the states and the Federal  On the due date  24
District.  - Direct to thIe
interested one
44LT  Bond issued  by the  Tesouro  t lest2  days.  Book entry,  -- Ori  the  due  date.  0
l  w5=  -g-  -E  - =  -v/MatyterestRates
Nacional to cover budget  nterest Rates;  ominative and
deficits  as well as credit  egotiable
operationis  for  receipts  Public Offering.
anitecipation.
NBC-E  Monetary Policy instrument, so  t leats 3 mont  s.  Book entry,  ommercil  o  ar,  p to 6 motit  s: on the  On the due date.  13/18
s to serve as an exchange rate  nterest Rates: 6% p.y.  ominative and  onsidenog  the average  edemption,
edge to tlse institutions.  egotitable  etling rates of the week
ays immediately before  ore tItau 6 moniths:
Puiblic  Offering.  he issuance and  emianualy, according
edemption dates of the  o the redemption
onds.  onth, with adjustment
n the fluency period,
hen necessary.
NBC-F  - Monetary Policy instrument, so  t leats 3 months.  Book entry,  loating dollar,  p to 6 months: on the  On the due date.  4
s to serve as an exchange rate  nterest Rates: 6% p.y.  ominative and  onsidering  the average  edemption.
egoti:sble  eIling rates of the week
edge to the institutions.  ays immediately before  ore than 6 months:
Public Offering.  he issuance and  emianualy, according
edemption dates of the  o the redemption
onds.  onth, with adjustment
n the fluency period,
len  necessary.
BBC  Monetary Policy instrument.  At least 28 days.  Bool  entry  -Nominal Value
nterest rates: --  ominative and  is the due date.
egotiable
Public Offering.
BBC-A  Monetary Policy instrument.  FirstPeriod of at least 7  Book entry,  verage adjusted rate of  n tbe due date.  15/17
ays, prefixed.  omiinative  and  he financing, according
egotiable  o the Selic, for federal
econd period of at  onds, accumulatedfrom
east 21 days,  Public Offering.  he beginning of the
ostfixed.  econd period.
LBC (3)  Monetary Policy instrument.  p to 30 months.  Book entry,  verage adjusted rate of  n the due date.  20/22
nterest Rates: --  omiriative  and  he financing, according
egotiable  o the Selic, for federal
onds.
Public Offering.
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Federal Bonds: 1970- 1999
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Figure  11.2
i-ederal  Bonded  Debt  Structure:  1970  -1999
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46Figure  11.3
Federal  Bondecl  Debt  held  Outside  the CB's  Portfolio:
The Real  Plan
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Figure  11.4
Federal Bonded Debt:  Composition and Average Maturity
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48Data Appendix:
Appendix 1: special  request  to Brazilian  Central  Bank.
Figure  11.1:  Brazilian  Central Bank's  home  page: www.  bcb.gov.  br
Economic  Data, Press  Release, Fiscal  Policies,  Table  XVIII (nominal  data). We use
centered  IGP-DI  to calculate  real dala.
Figure 11.2:  Brazilian  Central Bank's  home page: www.bcb.gov.br
Economic  Data, Press  Release, Fiscal  Policies,  Table  XX and real data as calculated  above.
Figure 11.3:  Brazilian  Central  Bank's  home  page: www.bcb.gov.br
Economic  Data, Press  Release, Fiscal  Policies,  Table  XVIII and GDP from Central  Bank
Bulletin, Table  IV.  13
Figure II.4: Brazilian  Central Bank's  home  page: www.bcb.gov.br
Economic  Data, Press  Release, Fiscal Policies,  Table  XX;  the same real data; Average
Remaining  Life (total  stock) data  are directly  sent from Central  Bank; Duration  (public
offers)  and Average  Remaining  Life (public  offers)  data come  from Economic  Data, Press
Release, Fiscal  Policies,  Table  XVII
Figure I1.5:  Extracted  from Barcinski  [1997].
Figure 11.6:  Selic Rate data come frcom  Bloomberg.  Volatilities  are computed  from interest
rate futures  market data, available  fiom The Commodities  and Futures  Exchange
(www.bmf.com.br).
49Policy Research Working  Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2378  Disintegration  and  Trade  Flows:  Simeon  Djankov  June  2000  R. Vo
Evidence  from the Former  Soviet  Caroline  Freund  33722
Union
WPS2379  India  and  the Multilateral  Trading  Aaditya  Mattoo  June  2000  L. Tabada
System  after  Seattle:  Toward  a  Arvind  Subramanian  36896
Proactive  Role
WPS2380  Trade  Policies  for Electronic  Aaditya  Mattoo  June  2000  L.  Tabada
Commerce  Ludger  Schuknecht  36896
WPS2381  Savings  and  the Terms  of Trade  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  June  2000  T. Loftus
under  Borrowing  Constraints  Joshua  Aizenman  36317
WPS2382  Impediments  to  the Development  and  Thorsten  Beck  June  2000  E. Mekhova
Efficiency  of Financial  Intermediation  85984
in Brazil
WPS2383  New  Firm  Formation  and Industry  Thorsten  Beck  June  2000  E. Mekhova
Growth:  Does  Having  a Market-  cr  Ross  Levine  85984
Bank-Based  System  Matter?
WPS2384  Are  Cost  Models  Useful  for Telecoms Daniel  A. Benitez  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Regulators  in Developing  Countr  es?  Antonio  Estache  36370
D. Mark  Kennet
Christian  A. Ruzzier
WPS2385  The  Rise,  the Fall,  and ... the  Antonio  Estache  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Emerging  Recovery  of Project  John  Strong  36370
Finance  in Transport
WPS2386  Regulators  and  the Poor:  Lessons  Richard  Green  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
from  the United  Kingdom  36370
WPS2387  The  Long  and  Winding  Path  to P,ivate Antonio  Estache  July 2000  G. Chenet-Smith
Financing  and Regulation  of  Toll  Manuel  Romero  36370
Roads  John  Strong
WPS2388  The Role  of Special  and Differential  Constantine  Michalopoulos  July 2000  L. Tabada
Treatment  for Developing  Count  ies  in  36896
GATT  and  the World  Trade  Organization
WPS2389  Vietnam:  On  the Road  to Labor-  Patrick  Belser  July 2000  H. Sutrisna
Intensive  Growth?  88032
WPS  2390  The  Social  Rate  of Return  on  David  Canning  July 2000  H. Sladovich
Infrastructure  Investments  Esra  Bennathan  37698Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2391  Are  the Poor Protected  from Budget  Martin  Ravallion  July 2000  P. Sader
Cuts?  Theory  and Evidence  for  33902
Argentina
WPS2392  What  Factors  Appear  to Drive  Private  Dipak  Dasgupta  July 2000  S. Crow
Capital  Flows  to Developing  Countries?  Dilip  Ratha  30763
And How  Does  Official  Lending
Respond?
WPS2393  Will  the Euro  Trigger  More  Monetary  Patrick  Honohan  July 2000  A. Yaptenco
Unions  in Africa?  Philip  R. Lane  31823
WPS2394  Tax Evasion,  Corruption,  and  the  Waly  Wane  July 2000  H. Sladovich
Remuneration  of Heterogeneous  37658
Inspectors
WPS2395  Decentralizing  the Provision  of Health William  Jack  July 2000  H. Sladovich
Services:  An Incomplete  Contracts  37698
Approach
WPS2396  Aid Dependence  and  the Quality  of  Stephen  Knack  July 2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Governance:  A Cross-Country  38526
Empirical  Analysis
WPS2397  Verifying  Exchange  Rate  Regimes  Jeffrey Frankel  July 2000  E. Khine
Eduardo  Fajnzylber  37471
Sergio  Schmukler
Luis  Serven
WPS2398 Determinants  of Current  Account  C6sar  Calder6n  July 2000  H. Vargas
Deficits  in Developing  Countries  Alberto  Chong  38546
Norman  Loayza
WPS2399  Managers,  Investors,  and Crises:  Graciela  Kaminsky  July 2000  E.  Khine
Mutual  Fund  Strategies  in Emerging  Richard  Lyons  37471
Markets  Sergio  Schmukler
WPS2400  Child  Care  and  Women's  Labor  Force  Monica  Fong  July 2000  P. Sader
Participation  in Romania  Michael  Lokshin  33902
WPS2401  Telecom  Traffic  and Investment  in  Scott  J. Wallsten  July 2000  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Developing  Countries:  The Effects  38526
Of International  Settlement  Rate
Reductions